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VIDEO Explozie la o centrală electrică din regiunea Moscovei: un mort şi cel puţin 13 răniţi

11 Jul 2019 16:42:41
Autor: Viorica Marin

6 Comentarii

11.07.2019, 18:55:01

Tehnologia ruseasca in actiune ....

-2 (2 voturi)
11.07.2019, 19:26:54

La Fukushima ce tehnologie era?

0 (2 voturi)
11.07.2019, 19:30:09

arogantu Trebuie sa fii o creatura speciala sa te bucuri de moartea unor oameni obișnuiți. US China

-1 (1 vot)
11.07.2019, 19:34:19

vasiliev Fukushima este un caz exceptional: cutremur de pământ, tsunami, plus ca unul din reactoare s-a topit. "S.1. CAUSES OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT (Study Charge 1) NAS's examination of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is provided in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report. Chapter 3 describes the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami and their impacts on Japanese nuclear plants. Chapter 4 describes the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, including the accident time line, key actions taken by plant personnel, and challenges faced in taking those actions. One finding emerged from this examination: FINDING 4.11: The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant was initiated by the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami. The earthquake knocked out offsite AC power to the plant and the tsunami inundated portions of the plant site. Flooding of critical plant equipment resulted in the extended loss of onsite AC and DC power with the consequent loss of reactor monitoring, control, and cooling functions in multiple units. Three reactors sustained severe core damage (Units 1, 2, and 3); three reactor buildings were damaged by hydrogen explosions (Units 1, 3, and 4); and offsite releases of radioactive materials contaminated land in Fukushima and several neighboring prefectures. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations and distress of the Japanese citizenry, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. Personnel at the Fukushima Daiichi plant responded with courage and resilience during the accident in the face of harsh circumstances; their actions likely reduced the severity of the accident and the magnitude of offsite radioactive material releases. Several factors prevented plant personnel from achieving greater success—in particular, averting reactor core damage—and contributed to the overall severity of the accident: 1. Failure of the plant owner (Tokyo Electric Power Company) and the principal regulator (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) to protect critical safety equipment at the plant from flooding in spite of mounting evidence that the plant's current design basis for tsunamis was inadequate. 2. The loss of nearly all onsite AC and DC power at the plant—with the consequent loss of real-time information for monitoring critical thermodynamic parameters in reactors, containments, and spent fuel pools and for sensing and actuating critical valves and equipment—greatly narrowed options for responding to the accident. 3. As a result of (1) and (2), the Unit 1, 2 and 3 reactors were effectively isolated from their ultimate heat sink (the Pacific Ocean) for a period of time far in excess of the heat capacity of the suppression pools or the coping time of the plant to station blackout. 4. Multiunit interactions complicated the accident response. Unit operators competed for physical resources and the attention and services of staff in the onsite emergency response center. 5. Operators and onsite emergency response center staff lacked adequate procedures and training for accidents involving extended loss of all onsite AC and DC power, particularly procedures and training for managing water levels and pressures in reactors and their containments and hydrogen generated during reactor core degradation. 6. Failures to transmit information and instructions in an accurate and timely manner hindered responses to the accident. These failures resulted partly from the loss of communications systems and the challenging operating environments throughout the plant. 7. The lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities within the onsite emergency response center and between the onsite and headquarters emergency response centers may have contributed to response delays. 8. Staffing levels at the plant were inadequate for managing the accident because of its scope (affecting several reactor units) and long duration." Link:

11.07.2019, 19:43:10

@vasiliev, probabil ca americana, care a dat chix in urma unuia dintre cele mai mari dezastre NATURALE din epoca moderna dar cu siguranta stii si ce tehnologie a fost la Cernobil care a dat chix in urma uneia dintre cele mai mari erori UMANE (iresponsabilitate, neglijenta, etc) din epoca moderna PS. sa stii ca n-am vrut sa te jignesc folosind termeni ca: siguranta sau tehnologie.

0 (2 voturi)